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Algeria's Counter-Terrorism Strategy to Protect the State from New Threats
The Sahel region is essentially a zone of crisis where the deterioration of the security situation will greatly and directly affect regional and global security. This region has become a safe haven for criminal activities alongside terrorism, such as drug and weapon trafficking, and it is also a region with ethnic minority conflicts. All these factors make the region an incubator for terrorism. Moreover, Libya's 2012 crisis led to a worsened security situation. Despite security measures taken by neighboring countries to protect their borders, a lot of armaments were smuggled to terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar-Eddine (AD), and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA).
Before the crisis in Libya there were threats to regional and global security, which pushed neighboring countries to quickly adopt different approaches to fighting terrorism and organized crimes in Sahel region. The neighboring countries worked together in order to face developing threats by combining local, regional, and global security to include the use of force. Algeria adopted a regional security approach based on activating military and diplomatic cooperation between concerned countries. The approach had several objectives. First, prevent any international competition for influence in the Sahel region.
Second, eliminate or prevent any hostile activities that may threaten Algeria's national security. Third, prevent any direct foreign interventions under the pretense of fighting terrorism.
Algeria refused to allow establishment of foreign military bases in the region, especially in southern Algeria, and stood up to neighboring countries that may have sought or accepted any kind of foreign intervention. Algeria and neighboring countries 2 succeeded for the most part, but not entirely in fighting terrorism and organized crime, and defeating terrorism politically, militarily, and even psychologically.
Definition of Terrorism
The definition of terrorism remains a matter of argument. What looks like terrorism to some countries can look like acts of resistance to others. Disagreement about the definition of terrorism remains a major problem that researchers and legislators face. Despite assorted challenges there are still many attempts to define the word terrorism. Efforts to define terrorism include: In 2004, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 condemned terrorist acts as "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature." and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 2 Some countries even supported extremist groups by meeting their needs and turning a blind eye to their activities, which helped them increasing their strength and influence.
Due to this situation and under demands from the people, the Algerian government decided to form self-defense "patriot" groups as volunteers to protect their villages from terrorist attacks in remote areas. Various factors helped those groups in their activities against the people and the nation. The bombings and assassinations by terrorist groups within urban areas and cities pushed the government to withdrawal border security forces to the cities in order to strengthen urban security. Also, the increasing availability of weapons and equipment helped terrorist groups take the initiative, at least temporarily.
Support weapons such as artillery and helicopters were ineffective for the security forces due to the forested terrain where terrorist groups hid. This new situation did not help the Algerian Army because it was a conventional army without significant experience in guerrilla warfare, and it lacked counter-terrorism special operation forces.
Moreover, to make the matter more complicated, the terrorist groups claimed they were, in fact, not terrorists. The absence of any initiative from religious scholars and authorities outside of Algeria to expose the truth about these terrorist groups expanded and extended the tragedy for a long time. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
The GIA was the most extreme and dangerous terrorist group in Algeria with about 20,000 members. It is an Islamist organization formed in late 1992 as a loose umbrella group of certain disparate Islamist movements fighting the Algerian military for control. 15 Their goal was to overthrow the Algerian government and establish an Islamic state. This organization adopted violence as a way to achieve its goals and objectives.
The GIA conducted a wide violence campaign of massacres against the population. 16 The GIA blamed the civilian population for not supporting the jihad and conducted massacres against them; 17 this revealed the ugly face of terrorism. In addition, the GIA declared war against foreign presence in Algeria. 18 The GIA killed more than 100 foreigners and used many brutal tactics such as assassination, bombing The AIS announced a ceasefire in 1997 to enable the government to find a solution for the conflict especially after the huge massacres led by GIA against civilians.
This decision led AIS to a conditional surrender and they disbanded in January 2000.
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Under the amnesty law announced by the President Bouteflika and by the January 2000 deadline some 5,000 AIS militants had surrendered their weapons. 21 The government released many political prisoners marking the beginning of new period of reconciliation, and the birth of the concept of peace and non-violence among Algerians themselves.
Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (GSPC)
The GSPC is a branch of Al-Qaeda in Algeria and the Sahel region, it is the largest and most active Islamist terrorist organization seeking to overthrow the Algerian government and establish an Islamic state. 22 GSPC has adopted the same military methods as GIA, but the GSPC stopped targeting civilians and focused attacks only on security forces. Civilians were, nonetheless, wounded or killed because of AQIM's criminal activities. 23 The GSPC emerged as a splinter faction of the GIA as a result of refusing violence against civilians when Hassan Hattab, the regional leader of GIA for several years, broke away from GIA and founded the GSPC. 24 After its foundation, the The GSPC was founded with the intention avoid using violence against the civilian population. In order to regain the people's support, the GSPC arose separately from the GIA. The GIA was responsible for crimes against civilians and refused the ceasefire that the AIS announced in 1997. The GSPC adopted a new strategy that relied on suicide attacks against state institutions, which led to a lot of casualties, but most of them were from the civilian population. The Crisis in Mali
For the past decade, the increasing instability in the Sahel-Saharian region has raised concern among Western governments. They have feared that the weakness of state control in the area would allow terrorist organizations to expand their influence and establish safe haven in an areas outside government control. 29 The recent crisis in Mali has exposed the difficulties that Mali has suffered. While the new situation becomes worse, international efforts to resolve the problem had no results. 30 The political situation in Mali became more fragile and in April 2012 the regime collapsed quickly and Mali's army was defeated by the armed groups and retreated quickly. The military coup on March 2012 created an opportunity for the armed movements of Touareg and jihadist groups to take control of northern Mali. AQIM and MOJWA announced an "Islamic state," which helped insurgents to achieve an important temporary victory. During these events, the Touareg did not pay attention to the Islamist insurgence forces because the Touareg were enraptured by their temporary victory.
During its history, Mali has suffered from internal problems regarding managing the diversity of its population and handling political instability. 31 The Touareg have always complained of negligence and discrimination by the Malian government, which has been dominated by southern ethnic groups since independence. 32 53 This is the same group discussed above, which used to be focused on Algeria. AQIM is not only spreading from its country of origin, Algeria, to the central Sahara and most notably to Mali and Niger, but also gaining a stronghold in other countries of the Maghreb. 54 The extension of AQIM's activities beyond Algeria into the broader Sahel region does not come coincidentally. For a long time, Algerian military and intelligence pressures in northern Algeria made the progress of AQIM's activities difficult, which was isolated in limited parts of northern Algeria. 55 Also, due to the military operations of Algerian security forces, AQIM suffered enormous casualties, as well as the elimination and surrender of many important leaders and dismantling of a lot of support networks. In recent years, AQIM has been operating across the transSahara region of Northern and Western Africa, 56 in order to create new spaces for terror activities, and to organize away from security pressure of Algeria, and to take advantages of the weaknesses of some countries in the Sahara region. This situation led the organization to seek new financial resources by kidnapping foreign citizens for the purpose of securing ransom, 57 and by trafficking drugs and weapons.
AQIM has been considered the most important player in the Sahel region among terrorist groups for a long time, especially after the organization joined the global AlQaeda. They have a strong presence in the region and they are very active, whether on behalf of global Al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations operating in the region. In addition, this group has had significant experience and has continuously adapted to new developments, especially security challenges. AQIM has strengthened its financial capabilities from weapons smuggling and ransom from kidnappings. The success of AQIM also derives positive relationships with various tribes in the region. Building 19 relationships is a key element of its strategy for rooting itself within in the Sahel. 58 This strategy provides security and protection for AQIM and even provides some degree of community access, if not support. These conditions have contributed greatly in the evolution of this organization and its efforts to take the lead with respect efforts to establish an Islamic Emirate in the Sahel.
The Regional Impacts and Threats from Libya's Conflict
The crisis in the Sahel represents a major threat to regional and global security, this region presents a favorable environment for criminal activities including terrorist organizations, organized crime networks, drug trafficking networks and illegal immigrations networks, as well as ethnic conflicts rooted in separation issues. Due to all these challenges, the region has become both more dangerous and unstable. North Only Algeria has the capability, expertise, and financial clout to make a real impact on the security issues in the region. 62 Algeria's security and political approach in the Sahel region has a great value for the international community, which has in the past appreciated Algeria's approaches and its role to ensure the Sahel region's stability and development. Since the meeting of neighboring countries in Tamanrasset Libya, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania developed the "Tamanrasset Plan" for regional cooperation to counter terrorism and related crime and agreed to increase the number of security forces deployed for Sahel counterterrorism to 75.000. Algeria has increased its forces to 25,000. 64 These countries agreed to execute mutual treaties and agreed upon the necessity for developing for the population of this region in addition to the security cooperation between neighboring countries. Also they agreed to criminalize giving ransom to terrorist groups. 65 The cooperation meetings focused on many objectives. First, the establishment of an information database about AQIM which will
give the ability for quick intervention at the appropriate time and place. Second, enable neighboring countries to pursue terrorist groups across borders. On the other hand, after Libya's crisis broke out and NATO's intervention, the situation became worse and prompted a situation which essentially threatened Algeria's national security. Algeria needs to create a new effective strategy focused on securing borders, strengthening the internal front against terrorist threats, while extending cooperation and coordination with regional and international partners.
During the 2011 meeting in Algeria with regional partners, there was unanimity about the impacts of Libya's crisis in worsening the situation in the Sahel region and threatening regional security of neighboring countries. The first result of this increased threat was the collapse of Mali's rule in the north. In order to face the new challenges, Algeria needs to establish an effective national and regional security strategy. This strategy needs to include helping Libya to build state institutions, and promoting Libyan security forces that could contribute in stabilizing both Libya and the entire region.
Algeria emphasizes that regional cooperation may help to eliminate terrorism and organized crime, and ensure stability, security and development in the region. Algeria has a long history in combating terrorism and it should make more efforts to help other countries by sharing its experience and encouraging the international community to contribute in developing the Sahel region.
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The conditions in the Sahel are a result of the absence of basic necessities of life, complicated by lack of education across the region's population. These dynamics contributed to the Touareg in Mali and Niger revolting not only against their 22 governments, but also against the ignorance and problematic policies practiced by the governments in power. At the same time the success of terrorist groups and crime networks is growing and making the situation worse. In order to face these challenges, the neighboring countries must establish democratic governance; enhance rule of law, respect human rights, while developing the natural resources which could help improve the economic situation. At the larger, global level, the international community should support Algeria's partners who lack basic capabilities to combat terrorism and organized crime. Due to their economic, technological, and military capabilities, the E.U. and U.S.
should assist these countries by providing equipment, information, and training to help fight terrorist networks and organized crime. The Sahel countries need international support in order to enhance their ability to protect their borders and for the political, economic and social development in these countries.
Conclusion
To ensure the success of countering-terrorism we need to address the factors that contributed to the emergence of this phenomenon, whether those factors are economic, social, political, educational, or media related. A multi-faceted approach is essential because many different factors push individuals toward violence as a response to their frustrations and the failure of government to facilitate societal integration. Algeria has an important experience in countering terrorism that could help to defeat terrorism and prevent its evolution and development in this region. Through its experience, Algeria alerted the world about terrorism which has no geographic limits and targets victims indiscriminately. In the early 1990s Algeria called for more cooperation to confront these threats. Algeria has been fighting terrorism in the region virtually alone since 1990, while the world was busy arguing about "who kills whom" and who would be blamed in Algeria. That was the situation until the events of 9/11/2001, when the world was alerted again and quite starkly that terrorism knows no limits and has no borders. Algeria knows that its stability will not be possible without the stability for its neighbors. That is why Algeria's diplomacy is committed to helping neighboring countries by providing the best environment for success.
Algeria's diplomacy operates in the African geopolitical framework. Algeria realizes that it lives in a region of crisis which is complicated by many security challenges that have the potential to negatively affect not only Algeria but the whole region. Those challenges include the failure to building political institutions, the absence or lack of a sense of national unity, as well as increasing ethnic conflicts which have fostered loyalty to the tribe rather than the state. Additionally, there are weak institutional and economic structures, in addition to the weak political performance and security instability in this region. Military coups have been as common as the spread of crime and violence. All this has contributed significantly to the increased instability which now characterizes the Sahel region. The net result has been the creation of a safe haven for armed groups, and armed conflicts.
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Through its comprehensive understanding of the roots of conflict roots and the nature of the region's crisis and the needs and interests of the people, Algeria's diplomacy has explored several approaches to protecting Algerian national security.
According to the security approach, Algerian diplomacy always prefers actionoriented diplomacy, which enables it to deal with instability cases or conflicts with neighboring countries. This effective diplomacy approach has protected the country for a long time and strengthened its relationships with its neighbors. From Algeria's 24 perspective regarding the regional problems, initiative inside the African framework will be not only the most effective solution to solve Africa's problems, but, in fact, the only viable course to long term stability and regional success. The international community and ECOWAS in particular must step up and contribute by supporting diplomatic efforts to find an acceptable solution. Further complications and destruction of Mali's society must be curtailed. Neighboring countries, including Algeria, should increase security collaboration with the international community in order to confront the complex challenges that permeate the region.
Algeria needs to play an active role through its foreign policy to promote its position: prevent war while protecting its neighbors and assuring Algerian national security.
Changes in Algeria's attitude about the military intervention in Mali will be driven by
